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RECENT CASES

appearance, the court has arrived at a new constitutional basis the Ninth Amendment.
What has been decided is that a state's invasion into the personal
rights and liberty of an individual, of whatever age or description,
should and does present an issue worthy of judicial review.3 9 The
resolution of this issue will involve the balancing of competing
interests, and strong justifications on the part of school administrato infringe
tors will be required before such regulation is allowed
40
upon an individual's right of personal appearance.
JAMES

TORTS-PARENT

&

CHILD--UNEMANCIPATED

BRING ACTION AGAINST
IES SUSTAINED

S. HILL

MINOR

ENTITLED

TO

PARENT TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJUR-

IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT.

Plaintiff, a seven-year-old child, brought an action against the
administrator of her stepfather's estate to recover for injuries suffered in an automobile accident, allegedly resulting from her stepfather's negligence. The trial court dismissed the action holding
that the stepfather stood in loco parentis to the child and was therefore immune from liability because of parent-child tort immunity.
The trial court also stated that even if plaintiff could maintain the
action, her stepfather would not be liable because she was a gratu39. However, on March 27, 1972, the United States Supreme Court declined to consider the issue of regulation of hair styles. Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972),
denying cert. to 448 F.2d 258 (1971). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented and stated in a
very brief comment that eight circuits have now passed on the question of:
whether a public school may constitutionally refuse to permit a
student to attend solely because his hairstyle meets with disapproval of
the school authorities.
. . . [O]n widely disparate rationales, four have upheld school hair regulations (see Freedman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (C.A. 10, 1971); King v.
Saddleback Jr. College, 445 F.2d 932 (C.A. 9, 1971); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424
F.2d 213 (C.A. 6, 1970) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School District, 392 F.2d 697
(C.A. 5, 1968), and four have struck them down (see Massie v. Henry,
__ F.2d
(C.A. 4, 1972) ; Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (C.A. 8,
1971) ; Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (C.A. 1, 1970); and Breen v.
Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (C.A. 7, 1969).
I can conceive of no more compelling reason to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such magnitude, on an issue of importance bearing on First Amendment and Ninth Amendment rights.
Id. at 1032.
40. See Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1972), in which
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court decision holding that the
regulation in question was invalid as violative of an individual's constitutional rights of
privacy and personal freedom. They again used the rational basis test and stated:
This court recently found that no rational relation exists between a similar
school regulation and the educational goals and processes of school administration. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8 Cir. 1971). We affirm the decision of the District Court under the analysis written in Bishop.
Id. at 77t.
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itous guest-passenger. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed and remanded the trial court's decision and held that an
unemancipated minor could bring an action against a parent for
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. 2 The Supreme
Court of Virginia further stated that a child under fourteen years
is incapable of accepting the invitation to become a guest and is
not included in the state's guest law. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va.
181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
The common law principle of parent-child tort immunity was
first applied in the United States in the 1891 case of Hewellette v.
George.$ In this case, a Mississippi court ruled that a child could
not bring a tort action against a parent for false imprisonment. Following this decision, parent-child tort immunity became an established rule in American law and was generally interpreted so as to
disallow personal tort actions between a parent and child, whether
negligent or intentional. 4 The rationale for the rule was founded
upon two basic conclusions: (1) a suit between parent and child
would cause disruption of family harmony and depletion of the family exchequer; 5 and, (2) a suit within the family may contain
fraud and collusion.6 Recognizing the hardships that this doctrine
implemented,7 many courts began finding ways to avoid the rule.8
In the 1963 case of GoZler v. White,9 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin took the final step and became the first state to abolish the
doctrine within its jurisdiction. The Wisconsin court stated that parent-child tort immunity was abrogated except where the negligent
act involved the exercise of parental authority over the child or
1. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190, 191-92 (1971).
2. Id. at 181, 183 S.E.2d at 190.
3. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The Mississippi court considered parent-child tort immunity to be a common law principle but it gave little support for this reasoning. For a discussion of the early history of parent-child tort Immunity, see W. PROSSER, THE LAw or TORTS § 122, at 864.-65 (4th ed. 1971).
4. W. Paossm, supra note 3, at 865. See Comment, Tort Actions Between Members
of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. R.Ev. 152, 183 n.168, (1961).
5. Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929) * Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). See W. PRossEn, supra note 3, at 866.
6. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960). See W. PROSSER, supra
note 3, at 865-66; McCurdv, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521 (1960).
7. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242. 79 P. 788 (1905)
(immunity was upheld even
when parent raped minor daughter)
Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675
(1939) (immunity was upheld even when 15 year old girl was beaten by parent with a
riding whip). See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 866.
8. Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. Anp. 2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956) (no immunity
when child is emancipated); Buttrum v. Buttrum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958)
(no immunity when gross negligence of parent involved) ; Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App.
120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930)
(no immunity when child has attained majority): Dean v.
Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965) (no immunity when suit is brought against
the estate of a deceased parent) ; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952)
(no immunity when injury resulted from parent's operation of a business); Vidmar v.
Sigmund, 192 Pa. Super. 355, 162 A.2d 15 (1960) (no immunity when parent was abusive
in punishing child) ; Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963) (no immunity when suit is for the wrongful death of child's other parent). See generally 7 CAL-s.
WEST. L. REV. 466 (1971).
9. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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where the negligent act involved an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to provision of necessities of life such as
food, housing, and other care.10 The court reasoned that since common law actions are maintainable between the parent and child in
property or contract disputes, tort actions should also be maintainable in protecting the personal rights of the parent or child.1 Since
the Goller decision, twelve states have followed the Wisconsin
court and have departed, in varying degrees, from the doctrine of
12
parent-child tort immunity.
In Virginia, the courts followed a pattern of finding exceptions to the doctrine' s and eventually announced the abrogation of
parent-child tort immunity for injuries sustained in motor vehicle
4
accidents. This announcement was made in Smith v. Kauffman
in which the court based its elimination of the rule on two policy
considerations which have been repeatedly mentioned in jurisdictions that have abolished the doctrine: (1) the social value of upholding the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity no longer outweighs the value of allowing recovery to an injured plaintiff;1 and,
(2) the increasing presence of liability insurance protects the defendant from actual monetary damage. 6 The court emphasized
that due to the passage of uninsured motorist laws and the increasing desire in tort law to allow an injured plaintiff a cause of action, the principle of parent-child tort immunity in reference to
automobile accidents was an anachronistic rule which should be

eliminated.17

In Smith v. Kauffman, the presence of the Virginia guest law
presented another obstacle which had to be overcome before the
plaintiff would be allowed to recover from her stepfather for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Virginia is one of thirty
10. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
11. Id. at 410, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
12. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967) ; Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d
282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, (1971);
Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Haw. 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Schenk v. Schenk 100 Ill.
App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ; Rlgdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d921 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1970) ; Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968) ; Brierev. Briere,
107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966) ; France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500,
267 A.2d 490 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529 (1969) ; Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) ; Smith v. Kauffman, 212
Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
13. Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953)
(emancipated child
can maintain an action against a parent); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d
343 (1939) (unemancipated child allowed to bring action against her father because the
father was the owner of a common carrier and the child was a ticketed passenger).
14. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
15. Id. at 412, 183 S.E.2d at 194.
16. Id. The court argues that depletion of the family exchequer Is rnore apt to
occur if the parent cannot use his liability insurance to cover injuries to his child but
rather must pay these expenses out of his pocket.
17. Id. at 413, 183 S.E.2d at 198.
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states which has a guest statute. 8 The Virginia statute9 is a codification of a rule presented in the 1931 case of Boggs v. Plybon.20
This case held that "a person transported in a motor vehicle as a
guest without payment for such transportation cannot recover for
death or injuries resulting from the operation of the motor vehicle
except upon proof of the owner's or operator's gross negligence
or willful and wanton conduct. ' ' 2 1 The rationale supporting guest
law legislation centers around two considerations: (1) protection
should be provided for the hospitable, gratuitous host who is supplying the ride; and, (2) lack of such a law would flood the courts
22
with collusive law suits between drivers and guests.
Recently, a great deal of controversy has erupted over the leg23
islative intent of the application of guest laws to young children.
Three approaches have been used by the courts in determining
whether a child in their jurisdiction has the status of a guest. 24 The
first approach is to treat children, riding at the invitation of a host,
as a guest and therefore incapable of recovering without showing
willful or wanton misconduct.2 5 The second view is that the guest
statute calls for an acceptance of the guest status by the rider.
These courts have held that either the child can accept the guest
status for himself or that the acceptance can be predicated from
the implied or expressed consent of the child's parent.2 6 The third
interpretation is formulated under the principle that a minor child,
because of assumed mental incapacity, is incapable of accepting
Morrison & Arnold, Automobile Guest Laws Today, 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 223 (1960).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957):
No person transported by the owner or operator of any motor vehicle
as a guest without payment for such transportation and no personal representative of any such guest so transported shall be entitled to recover
damages against such owner or operator for death or injuries to the person
or property of such guest resulting from the operation of such motor vehicle,
unless such death or Injury was caused or resulted from the gross negligence
or willful and wanton disregard of the safety of the person or pioperty of
the person being so transported on the part of such owner or operator.
20. Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 20, 160 S.E. 77 (1931).
21. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971). This quotation is
the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of the holding in Boggs v. Plybon, 157
Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931).
22. Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124, (1965). For a
general discussion see 20 DEPAur, L. Rav. 559 (1971).
23. The courts have been unable to determine whether a child could accept the
status of a "guest", whether a parent could accept the status of a "guest" for the
child, or whether no acceptance of the "guest" status is actually needed. 4 JOHN MARSHALL 3. PRAcTicE & PRocEDuREs 137 (1970).
24. Note, upra note 22.
25. Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968): "Assent to the
motor vehicle transportation Is not ordinarily necessary. Consequently, a child of tender
years may be a guest within contemplation of the statute." Id. at 4, 241 N.E.2d at 170.
For other cases rejecting the exception of minors, see Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75,
174 A. 323 (1934); Ruett v. Nottingham, 200 Va. 722, 107 S.E.2d 402 (1959).
26. Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal.
1954): "Many decisions of more importance and involving greater hazard are made
by parents for their small children daily." Id. at 418, 269 P.2d 69. For other cases with
similar holdings, see Chancey v. Cobb, 102 Ga. App. 636, 117 S.E.2d 189 (1960)
Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963).
18.
19.
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a guest status.2 7 Furthermore, consent of a parent does not make
the child a guest, imputing the acceptance of the parent on the
child. 28 This third method of construing a guest statute is based
on the preferred status that a young child often has in the law. 29
In Fuller v. Thrun,30 the court expresses this concept by stating:
It is our opinion that this child, being an infant under the
age of seven years, is a person conclusively presumed to
be non sui juris and therefore incapable in law of accepting the appellant's invitation and hospitality.2 1
In the few jurisdictions which have stated as a matter of law
that a young child cannot accept the status of a guest, the age
of seven has frequently been mentioned.3 2 Virginia, in stating as
a matter of law that "a child under the age of fourteen years is
incapable of knowing and voluntarily accepting an invitation to become a guest," 3 3 has become the first court to categorically set
its age limit at "under fourteen."
In summarizing Smith v. Kauffman, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court of Virginia has made two relatively novel holdings:
(1) that an unemancipated minor is entitled to bring a tort action
against a parent to recover for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
accident; and, (2) that the Virginia guest statute should be interpreted to exclude, as a matter of law, any minor under the age
of fourteen.34
Due to the similarity in Virginia and North Dakota law in
terms of a guest statute and the treatment of parent-child tort immunity, a view of North Dakota law in this area may be of some
relevance. In the case of Nuelle v. Wells,3 5 the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine was
not to be applied to an unemancipated minor's suit against a parent for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. The court stated:
27.
28.
29.
note 3,
30.
31.
32.
that a

Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
Id.
R.
PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 837 (2d ed. 1969); W.
PROSSER, supra
at 154-57.
Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941).
Id. at 413, 31 N.E.2d at 672.
Virginia appears to be only the second state that has ruled as a matter of law
child is
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guest

statute In

all

circumstances.

The first

state

to make such a ruling was Illinois which set its age limit at "under seven years" In
the case of Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970). Other states
have ruled as a matter of law that a minor child (under seven) cannot accept the
status of a

guest, however

these

cases

did not deal with

the impact

of parental

con-

sent because no such consent was found. Had parental consent been expressed or implied in these cases, the child would have probably been barred from recovery. See
Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) ; Fuller v. Thrum, 109 Ind. App.
407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941).
33.
Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1971).

34.
35.

Id.
Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967).
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It suffices to say that notwithstanding the fact that the
great weight of authority is to the contrary, the trend of
the decisions in recent years has been to depart very materially from the broad doctrine that an unemancipated mi-

nor cannot maintain a tort action against his parents. 8

The Supreme Court reasoned that since the legislature had allowed

for parental immunity from tort liability under specific circumstances, 8 7 this demonstrated that the legislature did not intend for
parents to be immune from tort liability for acts not covered by
the statute. The Supreme Court went on to state that even though
an unemancipated child would not be denied a cause of action
against a parent for injuries suffered as a result of the parent's

negligent act, relief in such an action may be affected by the North
Dakota guest statute. 8 While controversy surrounds the application
of guest laws in other jurisdictions because the statutes do not
specifically mention minors, 89 it appears that the intent of the
North Dakota legislature was to alleviate that problem by wording
the guest statute4 0 as to expressly include a "minor" who is "riding as a guest." 41 Due to the wording of this statute, it seems unlikely that a North Dakota court would be willing to exclude young
children from guest statute treatment.
The importance of Smith v. Kauffman can best be analyzed by
86.
37.

Id. at 366.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03 (1960):
To use or to attempt or to offer to use force or violence upon
toward the person of another Is not unlawful in the following cases:

or

4. When committed by a parent . . . in the exercise of a lawful
authority to restrain or correct his child . . . or by his refusal to obey
the lawful command of such parent . . . and the force or violence used Is
reasonable in manner and moderate in degree.
Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d, 364, 366 (N.D. 1967).
38. Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967).
39. See Note The Yeed for Clarification: Should a Child Under The Age of Seven
Be Included Within The Provisions of Automobile Guest Statutes? 75 DicK. L. REV.
432 (1971).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-02 (1960):
Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle moving upon
any of the public highways of this state, and who while so riding as such
guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of recovery against
the owner or driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle.
In the event that such person while so riding as such guest Is killed or
dies as the result of an injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then
neither the estate nor the legal representatives nor heirs of such guest shall
have any right of recovery against the driver or owner of said vehicle by
reason of the death of such guest. If such person so riding as a guest Is a
minor and sustains an injury or is killed or dies as a result of injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then the parents, guardian, legal representatives, and heirs of such minor shall have no right to recovery against
the driver or owner or person responsible for the operation of said vehicle for
Injury sustained as a result of the death of such minor.
41. The statute seems to eliminate the controversy of whether a child Is to be included by specifically wording N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-02 (1960), as to include "minors"
and by defining "guest" in N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-01 (1960), as "a person who
accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor." However, an
argument could still be made that a minor of a very tender age is not legally competent to accept a ride and should not be included under the guest statute.
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looking to the future trends in the areas of parent-child tort immunity and guest statute application to young children. First of all,
although a majority of states still adhere to the doctrine of parentchild tort immunity, it appears that this doctrine will receive less
emphasis in the future. Under the principles of modern tort law,
the social value of allowing a cause of action for every plaintiff
seems to outweigh the desirability of allowing parents to be immune
from all tort actions brought by their unemancipated child.4 2 The
second area, involving the liberalized interpretation of guest law
application to young children, will not undergo a rapid change.
Guest laws are statutory creations and hence, a strong argument
can be made that such laws should not be judicially interpreted to
exclude young children, but rather should be changed only by legislative action. 43 Notwithstanding the problems involved in judicial

liberalization of guest statutes, 4 4 future decisions may show a willingness of courts to exclude minor children from guest statute application due to the seeming injustice of allowing a very young
child to legally bind himself in a 'guest' status.
DAVID

INSURANCE-RISKS AND

S.

MARING

CAUSES OF LoSS-PAYMENT

OF REWARD BY

plaintiffs had
jewelry stolen, which was insured under defendant's insurance policy
providing coverage for loss by theft. The value of the stolen property exceeded the $2,000 coverage limit. Plaintiffs, in attempting to
recover the property, offered a reward in excess of the policy limits.
Voluntary payment was made by the plaintiffs with knowledge that
the company refused to participate in offering such a reward. Upon
defendant's refusal to reimburse, the plaintiffs sued defendant claiming that payment of the reward was a loss by theft. The trial
court found in favor of the defendants. The question considered
on appeal by the Supreme Court of Oregon was whether a payment
of a reward is covered under a provision in an insurance policy
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42. In most cases, the parent would still be immune from tort liability for activities
involving parental control and authority. This immunity, however, would not extend to
all types of tort actions, i.e., injuries sustained by an unemancipated child to the parent's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See generally W. PRossxR, supra note 3, § 122.
43. See generally Note, supra note 39.
44. The problems involved in judicial liberalization of guest laws include:
(1)
determining what affect the liberalization would have on present automobile accident
insurance policies; and, (2)
determining what age group should he excluded from
guest statute application. See generally Note, supra note 22.

